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Abstract
In 2004, the Norwegian Accident Investigation Board (AIBN), previously restricted to civil aviation, was 
expanded to include a new section for road traffic, which was to investigate individual road accidents. 
The overall ambition behind the new organisation was to reduce the number of fatalities in road traffic. 
This article explores the idea that the main task of the Accident Investigation Board’s section for road 
traffic was to construct a new kind of narrative about road accidents, which would in turn open up 
new possibilities for intervention. The article examines what characterizes the narratives they have 
constructed and how these narratives interact with conceptions of risk and causality. It also discusses 
how they fit into the existing structure of road safety work in Norway. It concludes that the Accident 
Investigation Board’s narratives are implicitly political, as they partly deconstruct the notion of liberal 
citizenship underlying the legal system, and that this deconstruction can potentially have far-reaching 
practical consequences.
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“The death of one man is a tragedy; the death of 
millions is a statistic”.
Attributed to Josef Stalin
   
Introduction
Road accidents are the eighth leading cause of 
death globally, and the leading cause of death for 
people aged 15–29 years (WHO, 2013). Norway, 
however, is one the countries in the world with the 
lowest number of road fatalities relative to kilome-
tres driven1 (European Transport Safety Council, 
2013), and Norwegian authorities have long made 
targeted efforts to reduce the number of fatali-
ties and injuries. In 2004, the Norwegian Accident 
Investigation Board (AIBN) was thus expanded to 
include a new section for road traffic. Their task, 
as defined by the Government, was to investigate 
individual road accidents, and to construct road 
safety advice on the basis of the investigations. 
The overall ambition behind the new organisation 
was to reduce the number of fatalities in road traf-
fic (Norwegian Road Traffic Act, §44). 
This article explores the idea that the main task 
of the Accident Investigation Board’s section for 
road traffic was to construct a new kind of narrative 
about road accidents. It discusses what kinds 
of narratives they have constructed, how these 
interact with conceptions of risk and causality, 
and how they fit into the existing structure of road 
safety work in Norway. I argue that the Accident 
Investigation Board’s reports have constructed 
new kinds of risk objects (Hilgartner, 1992) and 
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that the novel narratives and the risk objects 
they call into being are implicitly political, as they 
partly deconstruct the notion of liberal citizenship 
underlying the legal system. 
The article is based on government reports 
and whitepapers, published reports from the 
AIBN’s section for road traffic, and interviews with 
employees in the road safety section of the AIBN, 
in the Norwegian Directorate of Public Roads, and 
in the Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
The liberal citizen
The automobile and its infrastructure are impor-
tant defining features of modern societies. Roads, 
bridges and tunnels for cars are among our most 
costly and invasive infrastructures, and the car-
system shapes our cities (Hommels, 2005), neigh-
bourhoods (Bendiktsson, 2015) and even our 
natural landscapes (Hvattum et al., 2011). Road 
crashes are one of the main “unnatural” causes 
of death in most societies, developed and devel-
oping alike. On this background, cars, roads and 
road safety are strangely marginal topics in STS 
literature, where studies of cars have often been 
historical, typically centred on the development 
of alternative automotive technologies such as 
electricity (Gjøen and Hård, 2002; Brown, 2001), 
gas (Braun, 1992), and ethanol (Carolan, 2009). 
With increasing focus on issues such as 
pollution, public health, urbanisation, densifica-
tion, and land use, road traffic and car-depend-
ency are increasingly seen as problematic aspects 
of our societies. In addition, efforts to prevent 
traffic fatalities have intensified, and radical new 
approaches to road safety have been developed 
in several countries (MacAndrews, 2013; Elvebakk, 
2009), which involve a reconceptualisation of the 
relationships and responsibilities between actors 
in the road system. 
Jain (2004) and Wetmore (2004) have demon-
strated that the current distributions of agency 
and responsibility in road traffic and road safety 
are not given, but the outcomes of complex and 
reversible processes of negotiation and renego-
tiation. Recent concepts in mobility studies such 
as ‘the car-driver-hybrid’ (Sheller and Urry, 2000), 
‘the driver-car’ (Dant, 2004), and ‘the autoself ’ 
(Randell, 2016) likewise highlight how technical 
assemblages blur or challenge notions of subjects 
and objects in road transport. Although most 
people spend considerable parts of their lives in 
road traffic, little attention has been afforded to 
how these hybrid assemblages impinge on and 
interact with wider societal notions of subjectivity 
and citizenship2. 
The liberal notion of citizenship is fundamen-
tally linked up with individual freedom (Schuck, 
2002). Traditionally, liberal theories accept restric-
tions on the actions of individuals in so far and only 
when they interfere with the rights and liberties 
of others: your liberty to swing your fist ends 
where my nose begins. Implicit in this principle 
is the idea that the individual is the fundamental 
building block of society, whose actions, plans 
and strategies, in so far as they are not harmful to 
others, require no further justification. Arguably, 
this conception also implies that the liberal citizen 
is fully formed, and must be accepted as such, 
without reference to the formative process. John 
Stuart Mill, for instance, states that “there is a part 
of the life of every person who has come to years 
of discretion, within which the individuality of 
that person ought to reign uncontrolled either 
by any other person or by the public collectively” 
(Mill, 1999: 371). Thus being an autonomous agent 
involves being an independent entity (Dworkin, 
1972). John Rawls’ similarly presents the “political 
conception of a person” (Rawls, 1993), which has 
been described as “an antecedently individuated 
subject, the bounds of whose self are fixed prior to 
experience” (Sandel, 1998: 55). 
Sandel’s criticism is usually categorizes as 
communitarian, but also feminist theorists such 
as Robin L. West (1999), Judith Butler (2011)  and 
Wendy Brown (1995) have presented alternative 
visions. They argue that these tenets of liberalism 
overstress the masculine values of autonomy and 
independence, while ignoring that individuals 
belong in tightly knit networks, most importantly 
families. According to McClain (1991: 673), liber-
alism presents a “model of separate, atomistic, 
competing individuals establishing a legal system 
to pursue their own interests and to protect them 
from others’ interference with their rights to do 
so”. A central aspect of the feminist criticism is that 
it frequently problematizes the liberal distinction 
between the public and the private, arguing that 
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the (public) voluntariness advocated by liberals 
is illusory, as people’s choices are formed by their 
(private) socialization into, among other things, 
gender roles (Higgins, 2003. In other words, liberal 
theories ignore the histories behind the autono-
mous subject.
The corresponding tendency in ethical theory 
to treat individuals as fully formed and inde-
pendent has been challenged by those espousing 
alternative approaches to ethics, perhaps most 
notably theorists associated with ‘the ethics of 
care’ (Gilligan, 1982). These criticisms tend to 
emphasise that borders between individuals are 
secondary, and that relationships of entanglement 
and responsibility are prior to universal human 
“rights”, especially the right of non-interference. 
Autonomous subjects are constructed through 
a process of rearing, where women typically play 
a significant role. We could sum up these criti-
cisms as maintaining that the liberal subject does 
not have a history, is not to be found in a specific 
context, and has no concrete, specific relations to 
others. Kymlicka (2001) concludes that while liber-
alism seems a valid description of ethical relations 
between independent individuals, an ethic of care 
better describes relations to dependents. Since 
all individuals start out as dependents, having 
dependents is a necessary condition for having 
independents. The question then, becomes where 
to draw the line between the two states; when an 
individual can reasonably be considered autono-
mous, as is a premise for much liberal theory.
In liberal societies the tension between 
dependence and autonomy has frequently been 
solved through excluding certain individuals from 
the sphere of full citizenship. Various gatekeeper 
functions define when, and in what circum-
stances, one should be accepted as a fully formed 
citizen. Children are usually excluded, and so, in 
many contexts, are persons with severe mental 
deficiencies. 
The particular citizen of Norwegian road traffic 
is often defined with reference to paragraph 3 in 
the Norwegian Road Traffic Act, which states that 
“A driver shall show consideration and be alert 
and cautious so that he does not cause damage or 
risk, and so that other traffic is not unnecessarily 
obstructed or inconvenienced”. In road traffic, 
licencing requirements and regulations exclude 
children, sufferers of various deceases (such as 
Alzheimer’s, etc.) and individuals in states that 
can interfere with their ability to make choices 
(e.g. drink drivers) from driving a car. This citizen 
works as a standard, and like all standards, it will 
exclude as well as qualify: some people are not 
allowed to drive cars, because they are too young, 
do not possess the relevant physical or mental 
abilities, have not passed a driving test, or have 
had their licence revoked. For shorter periods, 
one is excluded from the standard when under 
the influence of alcohol, drugs, or certain kinds of 
medication. 
Making Norwegian 
road safety work 
In Norway, road safety work is mainly organized 
on three levels; national level (Ministries, the Nor-
wegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) and 
directorates), regional level (counties and regions) 
and municipal levels. Various public bodies and 
NGOs contribute considerable efforts on all three 
levels. 
At the level of government, the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications has the primary 
responsibility for road safety, while the Ministry 
of Justice is responsible for enforcement, and 
the Ministry of Education for traffic education in 
schools, and driver training. Technical road safety 
work is the remit of the Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration. 
In practice, the work has been divided into 
three separate spheres; on the one hand, there 
is the judicial sphere, encompassing law-making 
and enforcement by the traffic police. Secondly, 
there is the Norwegian Council for Road Safety 
(Trygg Trafikk), which is an umbrella organisa-
tion for voluntary road safety work and serves 
as a link between voluntary associations and the 
road safety authorities. The Council is to promote 
the best possible road safety for all groups of 
road-users, and holds a special responsibility for 
promoting traffic education in schools and kinder-
gartens (Norwegian Council for Road Safety, 
undated). 
Thirdly, there is the Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration (NPRA), led by The Directorate of 
Public Roads. The NPRA has sectorial responsibility 
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for roads and road traffic. The agency is, among 
other things, responsible for planning, building 
and maintaining state and county roads, and 
developing regulations and guidelines for road 
design, road traffic, driver education and vehicles. 
The NPRA also performs controls of workshops, 
vehicles, driving and resting times and seat belt 
use, and conducts driving tests and supervises 
driving schools. The organisation has an over-
arching responsibility to actively promote road 
safety, for instance through measures such as road 
safety campaigns. This means that historically, the 
NPRA has had a very broad influence over many 
aspects of Norwegian road safety work, and has 
not been subject to independent scrutiny, with 
the exception of the Government.  
The narratives about road accidents produced 
by the NPRA have traditionally been stories of 
aggregated numbers. The keeping of statistics on 
road accidents with injuries to persons or major 
material damages dates back to 1939 in Norway, 
while from 1964, only accidents with injuries to 
persons have been reportable to the police. From 
1977, a joint form for reporting accidents has been 
shared between the Police, Statistics Norway, and 
the road authorities. About 9000 accidents are 
reported annually (Statistics Norway, undated). 
These statistics contain information such as the 
date and location of accidents, the age and sex of 
those involved in accidents, the category of road 
user group (driver, passenger, pedestrian, cyclist, 
etc.), and the severity of injuries. Provisional3 
accident statistics are published monthly, and 
routinely compared to the number of fatalities the 
corresponding month the previous year and to 
the aggregated mean for the last five years. 
The NPRA and other actors such as research 
institutions develop further statistics on the 
basis of this data, for instance pertaining to the 
average age of drivers involved in accidents, the 
average age of the car, the day of the week and 
time of day when accidents take place, the risk of 
specific groups of road users, etc. Accident statis-
tics are also linked to other records, such as The 
Road Directorate’s registries of motor vehicles 
and driving licenses, and drug use data from the 
Norwegian Institute of Public Health. These narra-
tives about road accidents have thus relied heavily 
on a statistical style of reasoning (Hacking, 1990), 
where aggregated numbers are used to construct 
law-like connections between (an increasing 
number of ) phenomena and outcomes. 
In addition, the NPRA’s regional accidents 
analysis groups (AAG) publish annual reports on 
fatal accidents in their regions and occasional 
thematic reports on topics such as fatal accidents 
involving young drivers or cyclists. These groups 
began their work in 2005, and display an influence 
from system oriented safety thinking (Shalom 
Hakkert and Gitelmann, 2014) in their multi-causal 
approach to accidents and explicit avoidance 
of apportioning blame. Their reports, however, 
follow the traditional logic of the accident statis-
tics; they provide more detailed information on 
vehicles, road users and environments involved 
in accidents, but they still present their findings 
in terms of aggregated numbers and well-defined 
categories, and their results are combined to form 
a searchable database.
These stories told by the road authorities 
have served a specific purpose in the Norwegian 
system of road accident prevention; they establish 
causal links. For instance, the disproportion-
ally high number of young drivers involved in 
accidents has contributed to constructing the 
young driver as the kind of thing that may cause 
accidents, as a ‘risk object’ (Hilgartner, 1992). 
In this system, the risk object is never so as an 
individual, but as a representative of a group, 
and its existence is necessarily established over 
long time periods and through high numbers of 
instances, to avoid arbitrariness. Thus the calcu-
lated ‘normal’ functions not only as a descriptive, 
but also as a normative standard (Hacking, 1990). 
Specific measures have been developed to bring 
down the risk of ‘high risk groups’: older drivers 
are required to go through medical certification; 
driver education has been modified to improve 
the performance of the young4; targeted safety 
campaigns have been run, etc. A risk object is 
not necessarily a road user, however; there is an 
ongoing effort to remove unsafe cars from the 
roads, and the entire Norwegian road system has 
been divided into stretches and given a safety 
rating based on accident numbers (compared to 
the calculated mean). When there is a dispropor-
tional number of accidents on a stretch of road, 
the NPRA will consider various measures to make 
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it safer, such as improving the road, reducing the 
speed limit, or installing speed cameras (Ragnøy 
and Elvik, 2003). 
These aggregate numbers thus work as basis 
for policy, and policy is justified with reference to 
accident statistics. Statistics is accumulated over 
several years, however, and it can take a long time 
from a potential problem is identified to measures 
are taken. Measures have typically also been 
justified with reference to cost-benefit analysis: 
measures – and certainly big and costly measures 
– should ideally be profitable societal invest-
ments. Currently, a statistical life in traffic is valued 
at around 35 million NOK (Statens vegvesen, 
2010), which means that life-saving measures will 
be deemed profitable if they cost less than the 
number of statistical lives saved multiplied by this 
sum. The rationality of the system therefore rests 
on this logic of statistics and macro-level predict-
ability, and the quantitative stories guarantee the 
rationality of the system of accident prevention. 
In this system, a single accident necessarily has 
limited informational value.
Investigating road accidents 
Around 2000, Norwegian roads were among the 
safest in the world, yet the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications was strongly committed to 
working for further reductions in the numbers of 
fatal and serious accidents. Their ambition was 
to see accident statistics improve from one year 
to the next, in spite of the continuing growth in 
traffic. At the time, the government was also work-
ing towards adopting the Swedish concept Vision 
Zero, a long-term vision of a road system that does 
not lead to fatalities or permanent injury (Elveb-
akk, 2007; MacAndrews, 2013.) However, many 
traditional road safety measures were perceived 
to be exhausted, at least within realistic budget-
ary constraints. The question that arose, there-
fore, was, as one of the employees in the Ministry 
of Transport and Communications put it, “what 
next?” 
The Norwegian National Transport Plan 
2002-2011 announced the Government’s 
intention to consider the establishment of a 
joint accident investigation board “for all major 
accidents and incidents in sea, air, rail and road 
transport.” (Ministry of Transport and Communica-
tions, 1999).  In 2001, the Government appointed 
a working group to review an expansion of 
the existing Accident Investigation Board for 
Civil Aviation into an organisation similar to 
the American National Transportation Safety 
Board, which holds a broad mandate and inves-
tigates accidents in civil aviation as well as major 
accidents in the other transport modes. 
The governmental working group submitted 
its report in 2002, recommending that the 
AIBN be expanded to encompass the road and 
maritime sector. The report predicted that such 
a multi-sector organisation would benefit from 
economy of scale, and enable the introduction of 
a cross-disciplinary approach that would comple-
ment technical investigations with insights from 
the social sciences and competence on human 
factors (Ministry of Transport and Communica-
tions, 2002a). This recommendation led to the 
appointment of a second working group, tasked 
with considering consequences of the expansion 
of AIBN to the road sector. The report from the 
second working group was published in April 
2003 (Ministry of Transport and Communications, 
2003). 
The expansion of the Board met with no 
political opposition; the central-right Government 
which replaced the social democratic Govern-
ment in 2002, included the establishment of a 
cross-sectorial accident investigation board in 
their government platform (Ministry of Finance, 
2002), and the bill passed through Parliament on a 
unanimous vote and without debate (Norwegian 
Parliament, undated) in 2005. 
Among professional actors in the road sector, 
however, a more cautious attitude prevailed. 
According to the informants from the Norwegian 
Directorate of Public Roads (the lead agency of 
the NPRA), the Directorate was overall in favour of 
the expansion of the Accident Investigation Board 
to the road sector, but expected the Board to 
possess a competence that complemented rather 
than competed with their own (at this time only 
planned) accident analysis groups. 
The official documents provided a general 
framework for the activities of the new organisa-
tion. The Proposition to Parliament (Ministry of 
Transport and Communications, 2005) presented 
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a regulatory framework for the road section of the 
AIBN (hereafter AIBN-Road) that differed from the 
other sectors, as it needed to be adapted to the 
Road Traffic Act, but the organisation’s mandate 
was not described in detail. There was an explicit 
ambition for the organisation to benefit from 
its autonomous position (Ministry of Transport 
and Communications, 2003), and thus there was 
considerable room for manoeuvring when the 
practical day-to-day operations of the Board were 
to be given shape. The intention was for the new 
section to benefit from its co-location with the 
rest of the AIBN, and for it to adopt a method-
ology similar to the one used in aviation. There 
are significant differences between these sectors, 
however, which constitute potential obstacles to 
successfully copying methods between sectors. 
Most importantly, in contrast to what is the case 
in aviation, road traffic is characterised by a very 
high number of accidents, most of which do not 
lead to serious injury, and even in fatal accidents, 
the number of fatalities is usually very limited. 
The high number of potential accidents meant 
that an attempt to investigate all accidents 
and “serious incidents”, as in air traffic, would 
be forbiddingly expensive, especially since the 
new section was intended to be staffed with 4-5 
persons (Ministry of Transport and Communica-
tions 2005). It was therefore necessary to find 
some way of delimiting the task. The first working 
group report suggested that the Board should 
focus on accidents with “high risk potential” (not 
necessarily catastrophic consequences), and, 
most importantly, accidents that held a promise 
of safety improvement, through the acquisi-
tion of new knowledge (Ministry of Transport 
and Communications, 2002b). The report further 
assumed that these guidelines would probably 
lead to a focus on accidents involving professional 
drivers, such as public transport and road haulage, 
which could more profitably be investigated with 
the methods used in aviation, due to greater simi-
larities between the actors involved. As in aviation, 
one could address an organisational environment, 
rather than individual drivers and their diverse 
backgrounds and networks. 
Unlike police investigations, the AIBN-Road 
explicitly—and in compliance with international 
regulations for airline investigations— should 
avoid stating only one cause of the accident; the 
aim is to find out how several causes interact, 
and how the processes leading to the accident 
could have been intercepted at different points. 
Its investigations should not allocate blame, and 
the information uncovered in their interviews 
cannot be used as basis for criminal procedures 
(Norwegian Road Traffic Act, § 49).
Narrating the accident
The AIBN-Road published its first report in 2006, 
and has since published 3-8 reports per year. The 
AIBN-Road freely chooses which accidents to 
investigate, and publishes its findings in reports, 
which conclude with a list of “safety recommen-
dations”. The recommendations are based on 
the findings in the individual investigations, and 
point to weaknesses in the system of road traffic. 
The AIBN-Road submits its recommendations to 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications, 
which, in turn, forwards them to the Norwegian 
Directorate of Public Roads. The Directorate is the 
agency responsible for ‘closing’ recommenda-
tions, i.e. following them up with practical meas-
ures or policies. The Directorate reports to the 
Ministry, which informs the AIBN of the process. 
The AIBN’s responsibility ends with the comple-
tion of the report, however, as any further involve-
ment might jeopardize its autonomy. 
The reports usually focus on single accidents 
(typically involving at least one professional 
driver), and sometimes include lengthy technical 
appendixes. These reports introduced an entirely 
new genre of storytelling into Norwegian road 
safety work, as the focus was no longer on the big 
picture, but on one single accident at the time. 
The AIBN investigations have a duration of several 
months, and the reports relate the story of the 
individual accidents in painstaking detail, as illus-
trated in the quote below (all quotes translated by 
the author). 
Around 8 o’ clock in the morning on Thursday 
September 29th 2005, an 18-year-old girl drove 
from [...] in the direction of [...] High School, where 
she was a student in her final year. On her way 
she went by a house in [...], to pick up her 17-year 
old-friend. (AIBN, 2008: 5). 
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As we can see, this AIBN-Road report sets the 
scene quite differently from the standard accident 
statistics. It relates the story of the accident; how 
it unfolds inexorably towards the point where the 
car is hit by a truck when turning onto the state 
road, and the crash leaves the young driver dead 
and her passenger severely injured. The report is 
illustrated with maps and photographs from the 
scene of the accident. It briefly describes the two 
drivers; her experience with driving and her per-
formance in driving school education; his daily job 
and routines as a lorry driver, and working condi-
tions on this particular day. From this point, the 
investigation turns to the causes of the accident, 
and how the accident, or its consequences, could 
have been prevented. 
The report cited above concludes with the 
following three safety recommendations: 
• The Norwegian Public Roads Administration 
should detail requirements for visibility from 
driveways on the basis of existing regulations, 
and develop a system for following up the 
requirements.
• The Norwegian Public Roads Administration 
should establish guidelines to ensure that the 
right of way on crossroads leading onto heav-
ily trafficked roads is made clearer to road 
users.
• The Norwegian Public Roads Administra-
tion’s should analyse accidents involving driv-
ers with recent licences in relation to their 
achievements in driver education and driving 
tests. 
The recommendations function as the conclusion 
of the report, although not in the sense that the 
report is a deductive argument, as the logic of a 
causal analysis does not lead directly to recom-
mendations for prevention (Hopkins, 2014). The 
set of potential causes is infinite, and the analysis 
must always be based on a counterfactual story 
and expert judgment. The implicit counterfactual 
narrative is one in which the accident does not 
happen, or does not have severe consequences, 
and this does not follow from an accident analysis, 
however detailed. 
Thus the conclusions to the reports do not 
follow from the facts with logical necessity, and 
they can be disputed. In the early years of AIBN-
Road, the NPRA indeed frequently disagreed 
ardently with its conclusions and recommenda-
tions. This specific accident and the subsequent 
report had become a source of conflict between 
the AIBN and the NPRA at the time of my study, 
and was brought up in several interviews. The 
investigator in charge (ICC) of this analysis at AIBN 
was therefore on the defensive when describing 
the reactions to his report: 
[This report] has become a laughing stock [with 
the NPRA], because they think we have expected 
more than they should really be held accountable 
for. But I disagree with them, and – of course lots 
of other things are more important, but it’s such 
a central finding, that I believe it is important. 
This is to do with visibility; that you make sure 
that visibility is sufficient for you to actually drive 
safely. It’s not according to the books; that’s not 
it, but about what can be safely performed. And 
I believe that the road authorities should take on 
that responsibility and make sure that any driveway 
into the road network is sufficiently safe. (AIBN-
employee, interview)
In the narrative constructed in the report, there 
is clearly something that could be done in order 
to prevent this accident: improved visibility and a 
clearer right of way might have made a difference. 
There is a point at which the relevant authorities 
might have intercepted, erected a safety barrier, 
and prevented the tragedy. The system had a 
flaw, and was less safe than it might conceivably 
have been. The narrative also introduces a novel 
risk object; the unsafe driveway, against which 
measures should be taken. But on the other hand 
“lots of other things are more important” in the 
sense that they would be based on accumulated 
evidence, show up in the statistics, and probably 
prevent a higher number of accidents. 
This kind of narrative did not sit well with 
the Directorate for Public Roads, and one of the 
informants there presented the same case in a 
very different light: 
Two years ago there was this eighteen-year-old 
girl, recent driver’s licence, had driven from home 
and onto the public road, from her own driveway, 
and was killed because she didn’t look around. And 
then they made a recommendation that the NPRA 
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should control every driveway every year or at least 
at regular intervals. And, you know, it was her own 
driveway, and inattention. If, on the other hand, 
we were to inspect every driveway in Norway, that 
would probably amount to a hundred man years or 
so a year. (DPR employee, interview)
This creates an entirely different narrative: the 
story is first and foremost one about individual 
blame; a recent licence, she does not pay atten-
tion, and it is her own driveway, with which she 
should be familiar. Thus, the endpoint to this story 
is an established risk object, ‘young driver’ and 
a well-known statistical category, ‘human error’. 
These terms serve to tidy up the narrative through 
placing the failure in a category which relegates 
it from the traffic system to the moral and legal 
system. 
The story of individual blame ties in with the 
quantitative approach to road safety. The facts 
listed are known risk factors that are already 
familiar from road safety statistics, and as such, the 
story is brought to a satisfactory end: there is, after 
all, one cause, and that cause can be located in 
the single, young, inexperienced and inattentive 
person. The last sentence in the quote also refers 
to the rationality of the system; it can be read as 
an elliptical reference to cost-benefit calculations. 
Given that we have to accept that humans are 
fallible, and still allow them to drive, there really 
is not much to do about it. This is a narrative that 
does, in its own way, have a neat closure. In the 
manner of a crime novel, and in the manner of the 
criminal investigation frequently following a road 
accident, the story is brought to a close when the 
guilty person has been identified. 
This approach to road accidents was also 
referred to by another employee of AIBN-Road, 
who contrasted their own methods to the tidy 
ending to investigations in the legal system:
The police want to allocate blame and 
responsibility. If you have a single accident and the 
driver was killed, then it is not interesting, and the 
case is closed, because the guilty party cannot be 
found. (AIBN-employee, interview)
The closure of this kind of story is convenient, 
because it seems to suggest that there is actually 
not very much to be done. The isolated individual 
is to blame, and therefore the system is blameless. 
The story told by the road authorities contributes 
to upholding a stable set of relations between 
actors in the system, where the individual driver is 
allocated certain characteristics and responsibili-
ties, and the demarcation line between the indi-
vidual and the system is drawn with reference to 
such characterisations. Failing to perform relative 
to the standards places you outside of the system 
of orderly traffic, and renders you a subject of the 
separate system of legal accountability, and cat-
egories such as ‘inattention’, ‘inexperience’ and 
‘young driver’ serve as keys changing between 
these registers. The legal system thus upholds the 
system in cases of failure – it is the guarantee that 
the system is working, even in the cases when, 
apparently, it is not. 
Another employee at the Directorate for Public 
Roads was explicit that even if you could always 
“blame the system”, this was not always a fruitful 
approach to take to accidents: 
Causal chains can be traced too far, not every 
consideration is equally interesting. But this 
probably stems from the methodology, which 
to some degree locks in the AIBN’s work, and 
sometimes leads the recommendations in too 
many directions. It gets too complicated, too 
specific. One has to ask oneself what will contribute 
to the reduction of the number of casualties and 
injuries. (DPR employee, interview)
This quote illustrates how establishing the causes 
of road accidents is not a neutral and descriptive 
activity (Fahlquist, 2006), as causality is not just a 
factual aspect of the accident; it is related to the 
practical day-to-day work of accident reduction. 
Finding a cause involves proscribing a cure, and 
extending causal links might mean extending the 
responsibility of the relevant authorities in unfore-
seen and unwanted directions. An important ele-
ment of the construction of risk objects consists in 
constructing linkages between objects and harm 
(Hilgartner, 1992). Since there are many branches 
in the processes leading to harm, and because the 
branches in principle have no end-points, such 
a construction is always problematic. However, 
some such end-points have been established 
as ‘final causes’, among them ‘bad luck’5, ‘acts of 
God’, and importantly, in this context, ‘human 
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error’. The deconstruction of these established 
end-points that is a corollary of severing the link 
to the statistical categories leads to a proliferation 
of risk objects. This proliferation naturally poses a 
challenge for agencies tasked with interrupting 
causal chains that point in “too many directions” 
As noted, the NPRA has traditionally deline-
ated their charge through a form of cost-benefit 
calculation: any big investment should pay off in 
the form of improved accident statistics; ideally a 
sizeable reduction in the number of fatalities. The 
ICC in charge of the report was also quite aware of 
this of this problem, and did indeed see the Direc-
torate’s perspective: 
You have 10 000 road accidents in Norway every 
year, and some – I don’t know how many – are 
related to lack of visibility, but I don’t think that’s 
a lot. And then this is a kind of recommendation 
where you don’t go “Naturally, we’ll have to do this”. 
In light of having a lot of accidents, and then you 
are told to prioritize visibility in driveways, it’s no 
wonder you laugh at it. But then you miss out on 
a perspective – you are more concerned with the 
forest, as such, but not the individual trees, if you 
see what I mean. (AIBN-employee, interview) 
The AIBN, of course, was explicitly established to 
consider individual trees. Their task is to construct 
the story of the individual accident and its possible 
prevention. In contrast, the NPRA’s focus was not 
to prevent every single accident; it was to reduce 
the overall number of accidents as much as pos-
sible within the limits set by available resources, 
and within the framework of established routines, 
regulations and practices. As one of the manag-
ers in the department of safety in the Directorate 
saw it: 
The problem is that when [recommendations] 
become too specific you could have a problem 
with finances. For problems can be solved in many 
different ways, and not necessarily in the most 
expensive way. And you do not always need a 100 
% effect; you can do well with a 50% effect, to put it 
a bit simplistically. (DPR-employee, interview)
The NPRA narratives were not stories about ren-
dering the individual accident impossible. These 
were narratives of a reasonably safe system, where 
accidents might occur as the result of individuals 
failing to meet reasonable standards. The road 
authorities were committed to improvement, but 
perfection did not really seem to be on the cards, 
as long as individuals were fallible. Thus, their 
narratives frequently established end-points that 
excluded accident causes from the system of traf-
fic. In the AIBN-Road’s narratives, however, these 
causes were firmly placed within the system, and 
consequently, the NPRA was attributed a greater 
responsibility. These narratives, then, were revo-
lutionary narratives, redistributing roles, agen-
cies and responsibilities (cf. Wetmore, 2004), and 
suggesting a novel techno-scientific assemblage, 
which did not allow for the relegation of malfunc-
tion to the system of blame and law. 
Narrative strategies
What made the AIBN’s narratives revolutionary? 
For one thing, the individualised reports may 
in themselves be read as calling for more dras-
tic measures and they create a greater sense 
of urgency than the aggregated numbers pre-
sented by the NPRA, where individual accidents 
are statistical aberrations until otherwise proven. 
An employee in the Department of Transport 
and Communications remarked that reading the 
reports from the AIBN served as a cruel reminder 
of what she was actually working with. Unlike the 
statistics, the narratives contain characters who, 
although elliptical and anonymous, are made 
present to the reader through brief descriptions 
of their age, gender, occupation and everyday 
routines. Narratives work through absences and 
lacunas as well as through what they choose to 
display (Lothe, 2000), so when presented with 
the 18-year-old girl on her way to school, in her 
own driveway, with her friend, it is easy for the 
reader to fill in the neighbourhood, her family, 
her friends. The report’s brief account of the lorry 
driver’s working day before the accident seems 
to build up to the disaster through its undramatic 
style and content:  
His trip was the first of the day. He was to ferry 
concrete to […] a few kilometres north of the 
scene of the accident. Work this day was as usual, 
according to the driver, not stressful. He started 
driving at about 8 o’clock, and chose the same 
route as a colleague who had delivered a load to 
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the same address half an hour earlier. The driver 
reported that he was acquainted with the route, 
and had clear ideas about the right of way for the 
crossroads. (AIBN, 2008: 10)
The description of the routine and ease of the day 
renders vivid not just the man’s reconstruction of 
the events leading up to the accident, but also the 
sudden reversal of his day from routine to trag-
edy, and his painful justifications for his actions 
after the fact. The narratives from the AIBN have 
more in common with classic literary genres than 
with statistics; they have characters, a beginning, 
a middle and a tragic end. Thus the AIBN’s narra-
tive turns the accident from a “normal accident” 
(Perrow, 2011) and a number in the statistics, to 
something profoundly tragic, and, it would seem, 
something that should be prevented at almost 
any cost.
Secondly, the narratives of the AIBN-Road 
were obviously differently framed. In the tradi-
tional narratives from the NPRA, only a few factors 
– although their numbers have been steadily 
increasing – were allowed inside. In the NPRA’s 
annual statistics for 2011, the following categories 
were used: factors related to road users (speed, 
lack of skills, driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs, fatigue, disease, other factors), factors 
related to vehicles, factors related to roads and 
road environment, and factors related to external 
conditions (Norwegian Public Roads Adminis-
tration, undated). The category of ‘human error’ 
– a collective term referring to a number of the 
factors related to roads users – was one of the 
largest. The categorization enables comparison 
over time and across locations, and exempli-
fies “the strategy of moving toward universality: 
rendering things comparable so that each actor 
may fit their allotted position in a standardized 
system and comparisons may be communicated 
across sites” (Bowker et al., 1996: 353). Classifica-
tion, however, has not only a practical, but also a 
political function; rendering something explicit 
means rendering it visible, while other factors are 
excluded. While the category of human error was 
thus made very visible, its concrete instantiation, 
and any possible problematization, disappeared 
from view (Star, 2001). 
The individuality of the stories recounted 
also brought with it a distinctively new kind 
of geographical framing; in these narratives, 
accidents take place in specific, modifiable 
geographical localities. The tragedy takes place 
in this specific driveway, where visibility could 
easily be improved by cutting down specific trees. 
This is in stark contrast to how accidents, from 
the perspective of the Road Directorate, could 
be seen as taking place in an abstract sphere of 
identified risk factors interacting in semi-predict-
able ways (Beckmann, 2004). However, some of 
the employees in the AIBN suggested that their 
position was better understood by people working 
closer to the operative part of the Roads Adminis-
tration who “felt the problems more acutely”. This 
statement is illustrative of a perceived dichotomy 
between the local, material practice of preventing 
accidents, and the dislocated and atemporal 
scientific approach of the central organisation. 
There are two seemingly incompatible speeds at 
work; the urgency of the specific, local situation 
is at odds with the timeless, universal truths of 
science. Statistics seek the static; to determine 
whether the seeming cause is a real cause, or a 
spurious association, and whether the risk object 
is real or only apparently so.  
Thirdly, as noted above, the AIBN’s narratives 
did not find their natural end-point in the respon-
sible and fallible human actor, but extended 
agency spatially and temporally. In the Road 
Directorate’s publications, the individual history 
of the deceased driver is left out of the frame 
along with the disastrous aspect, the tragic. The 
AIBN’s approach was originally deemed best 
suited to professional traffic, since in organisa-
tional safety work, the choices and behaviours of 
the employees are seen as being at least partly 
within the remit of the employer. The employer 
can be expected or required to train or supervise 
employers, and in many cases, the organisation 
will be accountable, rather than the individual. In 
other words, the original instructions to the AIBN 
suggested that private citizens were better suited 
to remain end-points, and be evaluated in terms 
of individual liability and blame, whereas the 
actions of professional drivers could more fruit-
fully be seen as consequences of external factors. 
The AIBN challenged this idea, however. In the 
detailed narratives they constructed, every actor 
was part of a network that could be modified, and 
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that was already subject to official regulation and 
modification: 
 […] you actually have organisations behind every 
accident. If private citizens are on the road, then 
there are, we might say, no organisation behind 
them, but you still have an organisation behind the 
road system, which we look into. And we also look 
into how the systems work, among other things 
where health information is concerned. How that 
is taken care of; there are health requirements for 
driving. The health system, how it works, how it 
operates relative to licencing regulations. (AIBN-
employee, interview)
These narratives created an image of an encom-
passing network, where individual actors are not 
isolated first movers, but enmeshed in systems 
that shape actions and consequences. Contrast 
this with this opinion offered by an employee in 
the Directorate:
Your average car driver is not a professional, 
and using a “systems approach” is more fruitful 
when you are part of a system, such as employed 
by a company. In many accidents, the driver is 
the main cause of the accident, we are talking 
about explicit mistakes, and if that is the case, 
recommendations directed at other fields appear 
odd. (DPR-employee, interview)
There is a practical reason why the Directorate 
resists such attempt to challenge traditional 
notions of agency in traffic: if individuals are not 
responsible for their explicit mistakes – who is? 
If agency is spatially and temporally extended, 
who needs to act to make the roads safer, and 
who should control and monitor this onslaught 
of novel risk objects? So, again, it was suggested 
that a story should end when the culprit had been 
identified. The employees of the AIBN, however, 
objected to the use of ‘human error’ as a natural 
kind, and worked to pry open the category. 
It’s fine to have guidelines and road standards, and 
everything, but you also need to know that those 
standards work. If you built a road in accordance 
with the standard, and 30-40% of the people using 
the road use it incorrectly: is there something 
wrong with the system or with the people using 
the system? (AIBN-employee, interview)
The AIBN-Road’s narratives thus challenge the 
clear demarcation line between the human sub-
ject on the one hand, and the road system and 
the wider society on the other. Instead they pre-
sent agency and human errors as network effects. 
These two types of narratives will have radically 
different practical implications for road safety 
work, and simultaneously perform fundamentally 
different ideas about the nature of citizenship.
The citizen in accident 
investigations
As we have noted, liberalism’s essentialising of 
the political citizen, and disregard for contexts, 
histories and relationships arguably contribute to 
upholding the political status quo. The statistical 
accounts of road accidents similarly close off the 
citizen, through allowing their narratives to end 
where the citizen has been found guilty of ‘human 
error’. Thus, road safety policy also constructs a 
specific kind of liberal citizens, responsible for the 
consequences of their actions, but not themselves 
the outcome of earlier processes. 
In the case of the accident report discussed 
above, the recommendations given by the AIBN 
open up the citizen in different directions. One 
way of opening it up is through recommending 
that the story of deceased driver should include 
her performance during driver education. This 
recommendation suggests that having passed 
the test and becoming a licenced driver is not 
sufficient, that the history of the subject remains 
relevant after she has been accepted as a car-
driving citizen, and that the interactions of indi-
viduals, regulations and practices are (still) part 
of the story behind the individual accident. This 
suggests expanding the narrative of the indi-
vidual driver, and to allow this narrative to remain 
relevant after legal accountability has been estab-
lished. 
Second, it opens up the citizen through 
suggesting that the regulations governing the 
road users’ actions may not be sufficiently clear; 
thus the blame shifts from the blameworthy 
individual to regulating authorities. Although 
the regulations were not legally ambiguous, 
the report suggested that they might still be 
ambiguous to road users. Again, this suggests that 
Elvebakk
54
the story needs to be expanded: it now includes 
a larger number of actors –actors invisible in the 
official story as long as no formal mistakes have 
been made. The new actors are not those inter-
acting in the traffic system, but those shaping it, 
for instance through developing regulations. The 
system is capable of unambiguously allocating 
blame, but is now accused of co-producing this 
blame. 
Third, the recommendation that the NPRA 
should develop requirements for visibility from 
driveways and a system to follow them up 
indicates that the actions of an individual cannot 
be understood in separation from their material 
context, and that the material environment must 
be adapted to humans, rather than the other way 
around. The responsibility of the individual is 
presented as a quality that comes in degrees; it is 
possible to modify the surroundings in such a way 
that the individual is more likely to act correctly 
although it should already have done so; the 
fatal action is not so much a choice made by an 
autonomous subject, as the outcome of a material 
network of interconnected relations. This recom-
mendation also illustrates that the move from 
aggregate numbers leads to a proliferation of risk 
objects. When the risk object no longer emerges 
from long series of events and disproportional 
risk as compared to a ‘norm’, what you try to do, in 
fact, is to prevent this accident in the future. Since 
every accident is unique, the number of elements 
is in principle infinite. 
The recommendations thus present the 
accident as the outcome of a temporal and spatial 
history involving a number of agents, where the 
agency of the legally accountable citizen is a 
constructed entity and the result of a history, not a 
final and unitary cause. When opened up, the road 
using citizen turns out to have a Medusa head, 
with contents uncontrollably snaking their way in 
every direction. This distributed agency implicitly 
presents the system as liable to be held account-
able as the road user. This is clearly at odds with 
the Norwegian Traffic Act, according to which the 
drivers have strict liability for their actions.  
Concluding remarks: 
Narratives and politics 
As an extension of and supplement to concepts 
such as ‘the car-driver-hybrid’ or ‘the driver-car’, 
this case demonstrates how hybridity is not lim-
ited to the single vehicle. The borders between 
the individual, the vehicle, the surrounding envi-
ronment, and social and legal institutions are all 
open to renegotiation. Just as intelligent transport 
systems installed in cars will imply that “only as 
the car-driver hybrid can both subject and object 
get ‘smarter’” (Beckmann, 2004), an improved 
driveway might transform ‘inattention’ into ‘alert-
ness’ and improved driver education could elimi-
nate the ‘young driver’ as a risk object. 
The narratives of the AIBN remove some of the 
agency from individuals to their social, material 
and institutional contexts. This technical move is 
also political. There is a reason why “liberal theory 
has had to take individuals much as it finds them 
on the surface.” (Schuck, 2002: 132.) The AIBN’s 
reports present a view of causality and agency 
that conflicts with the one prominent in the 
NPRA. The AIBN’s approach to accident investi-
gations problematizes the notion of free choice 
through seeking the causes of individual actions 
and behaviours in the subjects’ past, and thus 
casts doubt on the citizens’ agency. The smaller 
the scope for relegating actions to the moral/
legal category, the more circumscribed the liberal 
subject. The laying bare of the processes behind 
an action is a double-edged sword; if a process 
is implicit, opaque and crudely articulated, this 
may be a sign of the powerlessness of the actors 
involved, but it may also an indication of their self-
determination (Star, 1990). 
Risk objects are causal, and thus the prolifera-
tion of risk objects will infringe on the presumably 
non-causal (moral, legal and reason-governed) 
sphere of society. Law and Mol (2002: 10,) thus 
warn that “absolutist” safety work comes at a 
price: “Too much of one good undermines some 
other good”. Arguably, the reports of the AIBN do 
not only go against the grain of liberal theories in 
their presentation of the subject; their focus on 
how public actors might prevent the individual 
tragedy can also be seen as an attempt at placing 
responsibility above autonomy, as advocated 
by an ethics of care. There might be a tendency, 
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however, that the consolidation of the individual 
as an object of value, leads to a weakening of the 
individual as upholder of values, as individuals’ 
actions, reasons or beliefs, once explained by 
reference to contexts, seem to lose some of their 
independent value. 
There is a danger of overstating the break with 
the past that the AIBN represents. Obviously, the 
legal system has always taken mitigating factors 
into account in road accidents (see for instance 
Fedtke, 2003). Also, assessing the safety perfor-
mance of different kinds of infrastructure is an 
established practice (explaining, for instance, the 
proliferation of roundabouts), and the existence 
of road safety programmes for children shows 
that the state does not take the formation of 
traffic-savvy citizens as a given, but as something 
to be constructed. The narratives of the AIBN are 
not completely novel, and they will not in them-
selves deconstruct the liberal subject – they are 
only stories. But, as Law and Singleton (2000: 
769) argue, the difference between telling stories 
and acting realities “isn’t so large”. So far as AIBN’s 
narratives and recommendations are included in 
road safety practices, at least in the sphere of road 
traffic, a slightly different kind of citizen is being 
enacted. 
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NOTES
1  The risk of road accidents can be measured and reported in different ways, and the choice of measure 
is not innocent. The simplest measures, such as the absolute number of fatalities relative to the popula-
tion, do not control for the number of driving licences or the number of cars in a country, for instance. 
The more frequently employed measure, used in this article, controls for the number of kilometres 
driven, which means that less affluent countries may perform worse, but also that efforts to reduce 
accidents through reducing car-dependency and traffic in society will be invisible in the statistics. This 
effect is reinforced by the fact that measuring risk relative to distance travelled will favour faster modes 
of travelling, implying that more sustainable modes, such as walking or cycling, appear relatively riskier 
than they would if, for instance, risk was measured through exposure time or the number of trips made. 
It is therefore a commonplace among road safety professionals that a shift to more sustainable forms of 
transport will typically lead to a higher number of road fatalities and injuries.
2  Brown (2001) is an interesting discussion of the notions of citizenship implicit in California’s Electric 
Vehicle Program. In his account, however, the role as citizen is opposed to the role as consumer, as the 
Program is seen to promote a consumerist conception of citizenship. While the distinction between 
citizens and consumers can impinge on the role of road users in various contexts, it is not directly 
relevant to the focus of this article, which is the regulative and retributive aspects of citizenship as it 
related to individuals in a government-controlled legal and technical environment.  
3  The reported numbers of fatalities and injuries are provisional until the publication of final annual 
numbers, usually by the end of May in the following year. Although the numbers do not usually change 
much, the process illustrates how the category of “traffic fatalities” is a complex construct: Only fatali-
ties taking place within 30 days of the accidents are included in the statistic, and confirmed suicides as 
well as accidents assumed to be the result of sudden illness are excluded. Thus, the number of fatalities 
in the official statistics are usually, counter-intuitively, lower than the provisional figures published.  
4  Interestingly, while young drivers did for a long time appear to be a very enduring risk object, this has 
now started to change: figures from 2013/14 revealed that the risk (per kilometre driven) of drivers 
ages 18 to 19 had been reduced by 40 % in four years (Bjørnskau, 2016).  
5  In this light, we might also interpret the fact that the World Health Organization launched its World 
Health Day in 2004 under the heading ‘Road safety is no accident!’, as an illustration of how the tradi-
tional end-points of road safety have been challenged for some time. 
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